https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6239-4066
Abstract
From the understanding that the mass public knows little about the benefits of international trade agreements but nonetheless opposes them with opposition representing a problem for domestic ratification, this research note explores if and what messages about the Trans-Pacific Partnership might increase popular support. The experimental results show that providing more background information alone does not increase support, but adding an economic message about how this agreement could lower prices or a security message about how it would help the United States counter China increases support. The economic message also encourages respondents to write a statement to their Senators urging them to vote for ratification. These positive effects appear even within groups that are more opposed, namely less educated citizens and Republicans. Our results address important questions about the formation of trade policy preferences, showing they can be shifted in directions contrary to one's egocentric interests and partisan predispositions.
Esta nota de investigación estudia, partiendo del supuesto de que el público en general sabe poco sobre los beneficios de los acuerdos comerciales internacionales, pero aun así se opone a ellos ya que la oposición representa un problema para la ratificación nacional, si los mensajes sobre el Acuerdo Transpacífico de Cooperación Económica podrían aumentar el apoyo popular y qué mensajes son los que lo lograrían. Los resultados experimentales demuestran que el hecho de proporcionar más información de fondo no aumenta el apoyo por sí solo, pero que el hecho de añadir un mensaje económico que explique cómo este acuerdo podría reducir los precios o un mensaje de seguridad que explique cómo ayudaría este a Estados Unidos a contrarrestar a China, aumenta el apoyo. El mensaje económico también anima a los encuestados a escribir una declaración a sus senadores instándolos a votar a favor de la ratificación. Estos efectos positivos aparecen incluso dentro de aquellos grupos que se oponen con más fuerza, es decir, los ciudadanos con un menor nivel de educación y los republicanos. Nuestros resultados abordan cuestiones importantes sobre la formación de las preferencias en materia de política comercial, mostrando que pueden desplazarse en direcciones contrarias a los intereses egocéntricos y a las predisposiciones partidistas de cada uno.
En partant du postulat que le grand public en sait peu sur les avantages des accords commerciaux internationaux, mais s'y oppose tout de même, ce qui représente un problème pour la ratification au niveau national, cette note de recherche explore si des messages sur l'Accord de partenariat transpacifique pourraient augmenter le niveau de soutien de la population, et lesquels. D'après les résultats de l'expérience, le seul fait de fournir davantage de contexte ne permet pas d'augmenter le soutien. Quand on y ajoute un message économique relatif à la possibilité que cet accord fasse baisser les prix ou un message de sécurité sur le fait que cela aiderait les États-Unis à contrer la Chine, le soutien augmente. Le message économique encourage également les participants à écrire à leur sénateur pour leur demander de voter favorablement à la ratification. Ces effets positifs apparaissent même au sein de groupes qui y sont davantage opposés, c'est-à-dire les personnes moins éduquées ou les républicains. Nos résultats abordent des questions importantes quant à la formation de préférences de politique commerciale, en montrant qu'il est possible de les modifier pour qu'elles aillent à l'encontre des intérêts égocentriques d'une personne et de ses prédispositions partisanes.
Introduction
This research note explores the domestic ratification problem associated with international agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).1 Presenting new data and evidence from a survey experiment, we consider how skeptical Americans might become more supportive of this international trade agreement (and potentially others like it) through positive messaging.2
As background, the TPP was arguably the centerpiece of the United States’ planned “Indo-Pacific pivot” to counter the rise of China through increased cooperation with friendly countries in this region. Negotiated with eleven other countries (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam) as an alternative to China's Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the Obama Administration signed the agreement in 2016 but did not present it before Congress for domestic ratification expecting that it would fail due to weak popular support (Choi 2016; McKinney and Galliland 2021). The Trump Administration then promptly withdrew the United States from the TPP in 2017.
After the US withdrawal, the other countries continued with their economic arrangement, slightly renegotiated and renamed as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).3 In 2021, China applied to join, and the United States could also try to (re)join to execute its planned pivot toward Asia. However, American efforts to enter this international agreement (before China) face a major obstacle as domestic ratification remains unlikely given societal opposition. While many members of Congress from both parties appear to favor rejoining,4 they stand to face electoral punishment in voting to ratify the CPTPP, which remains an international agreement favored by only a minority within domestic society (Putnam 1998; Trumbore 1998; Lantis 2006).
Opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership has been especially strong from less educated citizens and partisan Republicans (McBride, Chatzky, and Siripurapu 2021). The latter represents a partisan shift in terms of trade policy preferences given that the political right in the United States was more favorable toward free trade agreements (e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)) in the 1990s (e.g., Milner and Judkins 2004; Schonfeld 2021). But there is also resistance on the left side of American society, explaining why Hillary Clinton ran against the TPP during the 2016 Presidential campaign despite supporting it while serving as Secretary of State in the Obama Administration. Likewise, while Joe Biden supported the TPP as Vice-President, he has been silent about rejoining the CPTPP since becoming President (Alden 2021).5
The examples above highlight what might be termed the democratic globalization dilemma: how to pursue what many decision-makers believe to be beneficial international economic policies given what appears to be majoritarian opposition within the mass public. Indeed, American elites appear strongly supportive of the Trans-Pacific Partnership with 84 percent of policymakers and 79 percent of think-tankers either weakly or strongly favoring US membership in the 2022 Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Survey (Avey et al. 2022a, 2022b). Regarding the elite/mass public trade policy preference gap in the United States, Guisinger (2017, 189–90) reported how “political ads concerning trade [directed toward the mass public] have been overwhelmingly negative, focusing on trade as a source of employment losses rather than on gains.”
Based on the understanding that globalization advocates have done little outside of the college classroom to communicate the benefits of open trade and trade agreements (e.g., Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006), it becomes important to explore how to increase support for international trade and associated cross-border arrangements given popular skepticism in many countries, including the United States (e.g., Bearce and Jolliff Scott 2019; Bearce and Moya 2020). This research also addresses the important question in comparative/international political economy about whether individual-level economic preferences are static based on material endowments like education and/or ideational factors like party identification. And if preferences are not so fixed, then how might they be shifted? Can they be moved simply with greater background information, suggesting that they are formed largely out of ignorance (e.g., Rho and Tomz 2017)? Or do preference shifts require persuasion (e.g., Hopkins, Sides, and Citrin 2019), suggesting that they might even be moved in directions contrary to expectations based on one's material endowments (e.g., less educated Americans coming to favor international trade agreements)?
Our experiment results indicate that preferences about the Trans-Pacific Partnership are hard to shift with background information alone. However, adding a message about its economic or security benefits demonstrates a significant effect in making mass attitudes more supportive. Indeed, this effect is large enough to create majoritarian support within our experimental sample. Furthermore, the economic message shows a significant effect in motivating respondents to write a coherent statement to their Senators urging them to ratify this international agreement. Finally, these experimental effects appear not only within societal groups that might be easier to persuade in this issue area (more educated citizens and partisan Democrats) but also within groups that should be harder (less educated citizens and partisan Republicans).
These effects are arguably surprising given the non-results in many experiments designed to shift trade policy preferences (e.g., Hiscox 2006; Bearce and Moya 2020; Flynn, Horiuchi and Zhang 2022). Indeed, Alfaro, Chen and Chor (2023) even find that a treatment about the price benefits of trade leads to more protectionist preferences. Our results are also surprising given existing evidence showing that it may be easier to shift preferences for unpopular foreign policies using frames about avoiding losses (Tobin, Schneider, and Leblang 2022) following the logic of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). However, our evidence demonstrates that framing in terms of gains can achieve the same at least when linked to a salient economic issue such as inflation control or a salient security issue like countering China.
Finally, our results further demonstrate how sociotropism dominates in the formation of individual-level trade policy preferences (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). While sociotropism and egocentrism are not direct competitors since one's trade policy preferences could be based on both national and personal considerations (Schaffer and Spilker 2019), our broadly targeted sociotropic messages appear to persuade even those whose egocentric material interests should make them more opposed to the Trans-Pacific Partnership: namely, less educated citizens with fewer human capital endowments, marking them as scarce-factor producers in the US national economy with expected preferences against trade openness (Scheve and Slaughter 2001) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Stokes 2015).
Popular Support for the TPP
Survey research about the Trans-Pacific Partnership shows weak popular support in the United States. Politico and Harvard (2016) conducted the highest-profile survey making this demonstration, reporting that 70 percent of respondents had never heard or read anything about this international agreement, but among those who had, 63 percent opposed it. These stylized facts (ignorance coupled with opposition) accord with the Almond-Lippmann consensus (Lippmann 1955; Almond 1960). In terms of ignorance, only 39 percent of the respondents in this survey could correctly report that China was not a member state in 2016 (Politico and Harvard 2016, 5). In terms of opposition, less educated citizens and those who identify as Republicans report themselves as more opposed to this international agreement (Politico and Harvard 2016; Smeltz, Kafura, and Wojtowicz 2016).
From the logic underlying the Almond-Lippmann consensus, it might be argued that opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership could be reduced simply by providing more accurate background information. Perhaps if Americans understood that China is not a member state, then they would support it. Indeed, research has shown that Americans form their trade preferences based in part on who are the partners, favoring more democratic countries (e.g., Chen, Pevehouse, and Powers 2023), and the CPTPP member states include several established democracies (e.g., Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand). However, one should be skeptical that opposition stems only from inaccurate information about member states because citizens also appear to hold certain basic beliefs about international trade agreements: they cost jobs and limit American independence (Politico and Harvard 2016; Smeltz, Kafura, and Wojtowicz 2016). On this basis, the mass public needs to be persuaded about the potential value of this international agreement. But what messages might be persuasive?
To the extent that many Americans oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership because they believe that it would hurt the national economy, this preference might be shifted with a message (defined as information packaged within a persuasive frame) about how membership would help reduce consumer prices. Indeed, such a message identifies the primary reason why economists tend to believe that free trade produces net benefits for the national economy: while open markets may hurt some domestic producers, it helps all consumers with the surplus gain for consumers being greater than the surplus loss for producers.6 The proposition that free trade helps stabilize and reduce prices also represents a macroeconomic argument that many Americans appear not to understand (e.g., Pew Research Center 2004; Guisinger 2016; Bearce and Moya 2020); thus, being informed about this relationship may boost support for this international trade agreement.7
However, Bearce and Moya (2020) in their experiment to shift American trade attitudes found no significant effect on a message about free trade and lower prices perhaps because inflation was a relatively non-salient economic issue in 2018 when their experiment was conducted. But this same logic also suggests why a similar economic message may currently be effective: the inflation surge that hit the United States in 2021 raised the salience of this macroeconomic issue, perhaps motivating Americans to think more positively about policies that could help them as consumers per the logic offered by Baker (2009). Indeed, while a tighter monetary policy has recently slowed the rise in prices, inflation remains the top economic concern among American citizens, especially for Republicans.8
It may also be possible to increase support for this international agreement using a message about national security. Led by the United States, TPP negotiations were motivated by concerns about growing Chinese power. As Biden (2016, 50) wrote (to a largely elite audience) as Vice-President: “This deal [the TPP] is as much about geopolitics as economics: when it comes to trade, maritime security in the South China Sea, or nuclear nonproliferation in Northeast Asia, the United States has to take the lead in writing and enforcing the rules of the road, or else we will leave a vacuum that our competitors will surely rush to fill.” Indeed, in “selling the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact, the administration [quietly] touted its strategic importance—as a geopolitical counterweight to Beijing—rather than its economic benefits” (Layne 2015, 3 emphasis in original).
However, while the Obama administration made little effort to sell the TPP using an economic message, it was also careful about using a national security message. The underlying logic for this caution was to conclude the negotiations, which did not include China, without triggering China. However, with the subsequent launch of the trade war by the Trump administration, China has effectively been triggered if it was not so before. And since many Americans, especially Republicans, appear concerned about China's rising power,9 a message about how membership could enhance US national security might increase its support.
Following the logic advanced above, we offer the following set of hypotheses. Background information (about the Trans-Pacific Partnership's purpose, history, and membership) alone will not increase its favorability (H1). However, adding a message about how US membership would help lower consumer prices will increase its favorability (H2a). Likewise, adding a message about how US membership would help counter China will increase its favorability (H2b). Finally, given broadly targeted sociotropic messages, we hypothesize that their positive effects can be observed even within societal groups that are more opposed to this international trade agreement, including less educated citizens (H3a) and Republicans (H3b).10
Research Design
To test these hypotheses, we randomly presented 2,400 voting-age American citizens with information/message treatments about the Trans-Pacific Partnership in June 2023 using Lucid Theorem facilities. This opt-in sample is nationally representative based on age, gender, ethnicity, and geographic region. Randomization was executed through the Qualtrics online survey platform. Respondents were first presented with a set of pre-treatment queries including an attention check (asking them to select a specific response); anyone who failed this check was screened out of our sample. Those remaining in our sample then received their randomized treatment followed by the queries for our dependent variables.
Our experiment compares three treated groups to an untreated control group. The first treatment (InfoOnly) provides information about the Trans-Pacific Partnership's purpose, history, and membership, but includes no message about how this international agreement might benefit the United States. The second treatment package (LowerPrices) begins with this same background information followed by an economic message about how membership in this international agreement could lower prices for American consumers. The third package also begins with the background information but adds a security message about how membership could help counter the rise of China (CounterChina).
The two messages are deliberately bundled with the background information for greater external validity. In a real-life CPTPP ratification debate, citizens receiving messages about its economic or security benefits would likely also receive information about the goals of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, what countries are or are not members, and what Presidents/political parties supported it and when. To the extent that any treatment has less external validity, it would be InfoOnly, but we include this unpaired treatment to test H1. Its inclusion also allows us to separate the effect of the message from the background information in our bundled treatments as one can simply subtract the InfoOnly coefficient from a bundled treatment coefficient to capture the effect of the added message, and we report statistics comparing treatment coefficients with each other.
For additional external validity, both messages begin by mentioning the common belief “that international trade agreements lead to job loss in the United States,” thus priming respondents with this negative argument before presenting them with a positive message. Our messages are short (approximately one hundred twenty words), providing content that could be delivered in a brief political ad, either in print, on television, or online. They also contain a map image designed to reinforce the textual information in the message. Finally, all treatments include a manipulation check to ascertain if respondents understood their randomly assigned treatment. Our full treatment packages, including text, map image, and manipulation check, are presented in Online Appendix 1.
With the manipulation check, we consider two related samples to check the robustness of our results. The first contains all respondents including those who failed their manipulation check; this represents our larger intention to treat (ITT) sample. We consider the ITT sample following Barabas and Jerit's (2010) argument that survey experiments tend to overstate true treatment effects because many citizens would fail to receive the real-world treatment equivalent. The second drops the respondents who failed their manipulation check, providing an average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) sample. We consider the ATT sample to better distinguish weak treatments from ineffective treatments following Mutz and Pemantle (2016).
After their randomized treatment, respondents received two questions about the Trans-Pacific Partnership. One asked about rejoining this international trade agreement (RejoinTPP) and the other about Congress ratifying the same (RatifyTPP); see Online Appendix 2 for the wording of these queries and the possible responses. While we analyze these questions individually as robustness checks, we begin by combining them to create a quasi-continuous measure of support (FavorTPP) as our primary dependent variable. We justify this combination based on evidence that both questions capture the same basic concept given a bivariate correlation that is greater than 0.70. Combining these queries also creates a more reliable dependent variable, or one less subject to measurement error stemming from idiosyncratic wording in any single question (Mansfield and Mutz 2009, 435).
Our FavorTPP regressions begin with a specification that includes a set of covariates, all of which are measured before the randomized treatment. To capture the respondent's trade attitudes without directly priming on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, we asked them if they favored US participation in NAFTA (now the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)); this pre-treatment measure of trade attitudes is labeled FavorNAFTA.11 The other covariates are demographic and ideological measures that potentially influence trade attitudes, including education, income, age, gender, race, and political partisanship. Education and political partisanship will also be used as moderating variables to test our third set of hypotheses. These covariates are all described in Online Appendix 2. Table A1 (in Online Appendix 3) provides the descriptive statistics for the full sample and their balance across the four treatment groups.
Our regression models take the basic form of Equation (1), where H1 predicts that B1 should be statistically indistinguishable from zero. H2a posits a significant positive coefficient for B2, and H2b does the same for B3. H3a (H3b) posits a similar set of results in the sub-sample of less educated (Republican) citizens. To preview, we pre-registered and tested H3a and H3b using split sample regressions instead of full-sample interaction models because the former keeps them as directional hypotheses rather than turning them into null hypotheses for the interaction term (e.g., an insignificant treatment*Republican coefficient). But we will also report interaction results using the full sample.
Results
Table A2 (in Online Appendix 3) provides three FavorTPP models, testing H1, H2a, and H2b. The first includes the treatment variables next to the set of covariates described above. The second model drops these covariates to see how much the treatment coefficients change without them. Retaining this more efficient specification, the third model then drops the respondents who failed their manipulation check, moving from the ITT to the ATT sample.12
Figure 1 groups the treatment effects from each model, offering results that accord with our hypotheses. InfoOnly is not statistically significant in any specification, while LowerPrices and CounterChina are significantly associated with FavorTPP in all three. Indeed, not only are these treatment coefficients significantly different from zero, but they are also significantly greater than InfoOnly.13 LowerPrices and CounterChina are not, however, significantly different from each other; both messages appear equally effective in persuading voting-age Americans about the Trans-Pacific Partnership.14
Treatment effects with 95 percent confidence intervals on FavorTPP from Online Appendix Table A2.
While the LowerPrices and CounterChina estimates are statistically significant, it is also important to consider their substantive significance. We do this by disaggregating FavorTPP into its two component parts (RejoinTPP and RatifyTPP), treating each as a separate dependent variable. As a robustness check, it is useful to note in Table A3 (in the Online Appendix) that H1, H2a, and H2b continue to receive support when analyzing RejoinTPP and RatifyTPP separately. But our analysis of their substantive significance compares the percentage of respondents favoring (either weakly or strongly) the United States re-joining and agreeing (either weakly or strongly) that Congress should ratify this international agreement in the untreated/unsuccessfully treated groups (control and InfoOnly) with the same in the successfully treated groups (LowerPrices and CounterChina). From the results in Online Appendix Table A3, we calculate these percentages, reporting them in table 1.
Percentage in support of rejoining and ratifying the Trans-Pacific Partnership from Online Appendix Table A3.
| Treatment group(s) | RejoinTPP | RatifyTPP |
|---|---|---|
| control and InfoOnly | 48% | 48% |
| LowerPrices and CounterChina | 59% | 59% |
| control only | 43% | 46% |
| LowerPrices and CounterChina | 59% | 59% |
| Treatment group(s) | RejoinTPP | RatifyTPP |
|---|---|---|
| control and InfoOnly | 48% | 48% |
| LowerPrices and CounterChina | 59% | 59% |
| control only | 43% | 46% |
| LowerPrices and CounterChina | 59% | 59% |
Percentage in support of rejoining and ratifying the Trans-Pacific Partnership from Online Appendix Table A3.
| Treatment group(s) | RejoinTPP | RatifyTPP |
|---|---|---|
| control and InfoOnly | 48% | 48% |
| LowerPrices and CounterChina | 59% | 59% |
| control only | 43% | 46% |
| LowerPrices and CounterChina | 59% | 59% |
| Treatment group(s) | RejoinTPP | RatifyTPP |
|---|---|---|
| control and InfoOnly | 48% | 48% |
| LowerPrices and CounterChina | 59% | 59% |
| control only | 43% | 46% |
| LowerPrices and CounterChina | 59% | 59% |
As shown in table 1, only 48 percent of the respondents were supportive in the former (control and InfoOnly) versus 59 percent in the latter (LowerPrices and CounterChina) for both dependent variables. And if we compare the successfully treated groups against only the untreated control group, then the difference is even larger: from 43 to 59 percent for RejoinTPP and from 46 to 59 percent for RatifyTPP. Thus, for both dependent variables about membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, while only a minority (<50 percent) are supportive without a message about its benefits, a majority (>50 percent) become supportive with a message, thus crossing this critical threshold within democratic political regimes.
In Table A4 (in Online Appendix 3), we test the additional hypotheses that our positive treatment effects can be observed even within societal groups that are more opposed to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, focusing on less educated citizens (H3a) and partisan Republicans (H3b). Returning to FavorTPP, we test H3a using split sample regressions, dividing the ITT sample into two parts: citizens with less education (having not attained a Bachelor's degree) and those with more education (having attained at least a Bachelor's). Figure 2 shows that the treatment effects for LowerPrices and CounterChina tend to be somewhat greater in the more educated sub-sample, which is not surprising given that those with greater educational attainment in the United States benefit from open trade as consumers and abundant-factor producers in addition to receiving more socialization about the advantages of international trade. However, statistically significant positive effects also appear in the less educated sub-sample, showing how our messages also reached this societal group with greater expected opposition to this international trade agreement based at least on their position as producers.15
We test H3b by dividing the ITT sample into two partisan components: citizens who report as Republican and those who do not, combining respondents who identify as Democrat or Independent. There are certainly stronger point estimates for both message treatments in the non-Republican ITT sub-sample, which is not surprising given that the Biden administration would presently get credit for this “beneficial” policy choice. But the CounterChina message also shows a significant effect in boosting support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership among all respondents who report as Republican. And when the sub-sample includes only those who passed the treatment check (the ATT sample), then both messages, including Lower Prices, have a significant positive effect on Republican support (see Table A6 in Online Appendix 3) at least when using a one-tailed test, which would be appropriate given our directional hypotheses.16
In these split sample regressions using the ATT sample, it is also interesting to note that InfoOnly becomes statistically significant for the non-Republican sub-sample, contrary to the expectations of H1. We suspect that this result may stem from the fact that citizens in this group do not include many Trump supporters and when reminded that President Trump opposed the TPP, a fact that was included in our background information, they become more supportive of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in opposition to his position concerning this international trade agreement.
Writing to Members of Congress
Having focused on citizen attitudes about the Trans-Pacific Partnership as the primary obstacle to Congressional ratification, it is also important to consider if our messages would motivate respondents to contact their members of Congress, urging them to vote in favor of ratification. Our “semibehavioral task” following Adida, Lo, and Platas (2018, 9522) asked respondents to consider writing a “statement of support that could be forwarded to the Senators from your state (identified in an earlier question), urging them to vote in favor of ratifying this international agreement.”17 Writing a statement was not a required activity, and all respondents could decline the task. Furthermore, the instructions encouraged respondents to “use complete sentences and explain why your Senators should vote in favor of ratifying the Trans-Pacific Partnership.” About 900 respondents wrote something, but only half (449) offered a coherent positive statement that fit these instructions. Online Appendix 4 offers some examples of the written statements that were coded as 1 and others that were coded as 0, thus constructing our dichotomous semi-behavioral dependent variable labeled WroteStatement.
With WroteStatement as the dependent variable, Table A7 (in Online Appendix 3) tests H1, H2a, and H2b.18 The first model uses the full sample with covariates, the second drops the covariates using the ITT sample, and the third model switches to the ATT sample. As shown in figure 3, InfoOnly is never statistically significant, consistent with H1. Consistent with H2a, LowerPrices is positively signed and statistically significant in all three models. While CounterChina is always positively signed, it only becomes statistically significant consistent with H2b when using the ATT sample. But while the point estimate for LowerPrices is larger than CounterChina even in the ATT model, where both are statistically significant, there is no significant difference between the two message treatments when using the sample of those who were more confidently treated by our messages.19
Treatment effects with 95 percent confidence intervals on WroteStatement from Online Appendix Table A7.
Table A8 (in Online Appendix 3) presents the sequence of split sample models, testing H3a and H3b in terms of this semi-behavioral dependent variable. Consistent with H3a, LowerPrices has a significant positive effect on those with less education. And consistent with H3b, this same message has a significant positive effect among Republicans. However, CounterChina has no significant effect for either less educated citizens or Republicans. It does, however, have a significant positive effect for less educated citizens when using the ATT sample as shown in Table A9 (in Online Appendix 3) at least when using a one-tailed test. Indeed, within the ATT sample, CounterChina has a significant effect in three of the four groups considered. And LowerPrices has a significant effect in motivating respondents to write a supportive message to their Senators in all four groups as shown in figure 4.
Split sample treatment effects on WroteStatement with 95 percent confidence intervals from Online Appendix Tables A8 and A9.
We recognize that the relatively broad effects associated with our sociotropic messages would likely be different with more targeted messages. For example, an endorsement experiment where prominent Democrats describe the benefits of joining the CPTPP might be expected to increase support among Democrats but not among Republicans (Guisinger and Saunders 2017). However, there may also be targeted ways to boost support among Republicans, possibly through a message about how President Trump reconsidered his withdrawal from the TPP.20 We do not consider targeted experiments in this research note, but they stand as an important next step in a research program considering how to reduce societal opposition to international agreements.
Conclusion
Based on the understanding that a large portion of the mass public knows little about the benefits of international trade agreements but nonetheless opposes them with this resistance representing a problem for domestic ratification in a democratic society, this research note explored if and what messages about the Trans-Pacific Partnership might increase American popular support. Our experiment showed that providing more accurate background information alone did not increase broad support. However, it demonstrated that adding an economic message about how this international agreement could lower consumer prices increased broad support, as did a security message about how it could help the United States counter the rise of China. Furthermore, the economic message motivated respondents to write a statement of support that could be forwarded to their Senators urging domestic ratification. Indeed, these experimental effects appeared not only within societal groups that might be easier to persuade in this issue area but also within groups that start as more opposed: less educated citizens and partisan Republicans.
These results provide both academic and public policy value. In terms of the former, they further demonstrate how individual-level economic policy preferences are not so fixed, either by material factors such as education or by ideational factors such as partisanship. In fact, our findings demonstrate that it was possible to persuade less educated Americans, expected to be opposed to international trade agreements based at least on their interests as scarce-factor producers in the US national economy, to become more favorable through messages about the sociotropic benefits associated with the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Likewise, Republicans were once more favorable toward international trade agreements, and our results show how it may be possible to move these citizens back in this direction: appeal to their inflation concerns, which even stimulated Republicans to write a message of support to their Senators urging them to vote in favor of ratifying the CPTPP.
This understanding leads directly to the policy implications associated with our results. Especially since the populist backlash hit the United States around 2015, policymakers have struggled with how to reconcile foreign economic policy (e.g., open trade) with the apparent preferences expressed by the mass public (e.g., greater trade protection). One possible way to resolve this gap is to shift actual policy toward the preferences of the mass public. However, most policymakers believe that such policy change would be costly in the long run (e.g., disengagement with countries in the Asia-Pacific region and higher prices at home), leading back to the “democratic globalization dilemma” discussed in the introduction.
An alternative would be to persuade more of the American mass public about the value of these foreign economic policies. Our results show how it may be possible to broaden popular support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And with reduced societal opposition, this international trade agreement, negotiated through both Republican and Democratic presidential administrations, becomes a more viable option for the United States to execute its planned Indo-Pacific pivot. Indeed, our findings have implications that extend beyond the Trans-Pacific Partnership, suggesting that positive messages could be employed to increase public support for other international trade agreements (e.g., the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) and for foreign economic policies (e.g., greater foreign aid and immigration openness) opposed by a majority within the American mass public.
Acknowledgement
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Institute of Behavioral Science at the University of Colorado Boulder in October 2021, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in April 2022, APSA in September 2022, and IPES in October 2022. We thank Mike Albertson, Andy Baker, Celeste Beasley, Vivienne Born, Carew Boulding, Stephen Chaudoin, Brendan Connell, Jonas Gamso, Joe Harvey, Alex Honeker, Margaret Kenney, David Leblang, Keith Maskus, Bar Nadel, Gautam Nair, Clara Park, Jon Pevehouse, Megan Roosevelt, Thomas Sattler, Meg Shannon, Sarah Sokhey, David Steinberg, Robert Trager, Ryan Weldzius, Brandon Williams, and Robert Wyrod for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Kyle Engels for his research assistance. IRB documentation will be provided upon request.
Author Biography
David H. Bearce is the Head of the International Affairs Department in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and the Brent Scowcroft Chair in International Policy Studies. His research focuses on the politics of international trade, labor migration, and monetary policy.
Seungbin Park is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alabama. Her research focuses on foreign direct investment, migration, non-trade issue provisions, and attitudes toward transnational movements.
Notes
Data Statement: The data underlying this article are available on the ISQ Dataverse, at https://dataverse-harvard-edu.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/dataverse/isq.
Footnotes
The domestic ratification problem helps explain why the United States, despite being a leading advocate for free trade post-WWII, has concluded preferential trading arrangements with only twenty, mostly smaller and lesser developed, countries: Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, Singapore, and South Korea. Since the US tariff rate tends to be relatively low in most product categories, the lack of such preferential arrangements means that American exporters usually face higher tariffs than foreign producers seeking to enter the US market, thus contributing to the trade deficit.
These experimental results were not presented but briefly mentioned in a parallel paper written for a policy audience (Bearce and Park 2023).
We reserve the acronyms TPP and CPTPP to refer to specific versions of this international trade agreement, while using “Trans-Pacific Partnership” to refer to this agreement more broadly.
For example, discussing the Biden administration's plans for an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) as an alternative to the CPTPP, Senator “Mike Crapo (R-ID) said 'IPEF may be a positive first step to engagement in Asia, but it is no substitute for comprehensive trade agreements [like the TPP].' Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ) [similarly] stated that the IPEF is not 'as robust as we need. We missed an opportunity in TPP’” (Smith, 2022, “Success Unlikely in Indo-Pacific Economic Framework without New Market Access,” American Action Forum, accessed August 1, 2022, https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/success-unlikely-in-indo-pacific-economic-framework-without-new-market-access).
To circumvent the domestic ratification problem, President Biden unveiled his IPEF in May 2022 as an executive action not requiring Congressional ratification. But it was quickly identified as a “second-best option to the United States joining the CPTPP” (Goodman and Arasasingham 2022, 2) “fall[ing] short of expectations in the region” (Natalegawa and Poling 2022, 13) since it offers no preferential market access. However, the IPEF may be a prelude to entering the CPTPP, or “the starting point for future, more comprehensive efforts” to “facilitate future trade agreements with market access provisions when the political winds shift in Washington” (Natalegawa and Poling 2022).
The surplus for consumers is the difference between what they would be willing to pay and the lower price that they pay. The surplus for producers is the difference between what they would be willing to accept and the price that they receive.
This paper thus joins the recent literature on inflation aversion (e.g., Aklin, Arias, and Gray 2022) exploring what policies may be preferred by citizens based on this aversion.
For evidence on this point from Pew and Gallup, see Pew Research Center, 2023b, “Inflation, Health Costs, Partisan Cooperation Among the Nation's Top Problems,” Pew Research Center, accessed August 17, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/06/21/inflation-health-costs-partisan-cooperation-among-the-nations-top-problems/ and Gallup, n.d., “Most Important Problem,” Gallup, accessed August 17, 2023, https://news-gallup-com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx.
For evidence on this point from Pew and Gallup, see Pew Research Center, 2023a, “Americans Are Critical of China's Global Role as Well as Its Relationship with Russia,” Pew Research Center, accessed October 28, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/04/12/americans-are-critical-of-chinas-global-role-as-well-as-its-relationship-with-russia/#americans-are-more-likely-to-see-china-as-a-competitor-than-enemy-though-the-share-who-says-enemy-has-grown-over-the-past-year and Gallup, 2023, “Americans Continue to View China as the Greatest Enemy,” Gallup, accessed November 20, 2023, https://news-gallup-com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/poll/471494/americans-continue-view-china-greatest-enemy.aspx.
These hypotheses were pre-registered: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=YJ2_YN1.
Including this measure as a covariate tends to weaken the coefficient of other covariates like Education since its effect is already captured in the measure of prior trade attitudes. Indeed, Education is a significant positive predictor of FavorNAFTA, and it becomes statistically significant when FavorNAFTA is dropped from our specification.
Given that Lucid respondents are not particularly motivated (i.e., they are compensated simply for completing the survey and cannot be rated like Mechanical Turkers) and that our treatments, while short, convey complex arguments, it is not surprising to observe relatively high failure rates for the manipulation checks. The lowest failure rate comes for InfoOnly (38 percent) with only one manipulation check. There are higher failure rates for the bundled message treatments with two manipulation checks (50 percent for LowerPrices and 52 percent for CounterChina).
For example, the F test for LowerPrices = InfoOnly is 10.82 (p = 0.00) and the F test for CounterChina = InfoOnly is 21.32 (p = 0.00) in the first model.
The F test for LowerPrices = CounterChina is 0.11 (p = 0.74) in the first model.
When estimating a full sample model interacting each treatment variable with a dummy variable for having attained at least a Bachelor's degree, both the LowerPrices and CounterChina constitutive terms are positively signed and statistically significant, indicating treatment effects for those without a Bachelor's degree consistent with H3a (see Table A5 in Online Appendix 3).
When estimating a full sample model interacting each treatment variable with the Republican dummy variable (see Table A5 in Online Appendix 3), neither the LowerPrices nor the CounterChina interaction terms are statistically significant, indicating that the treatment effects for Republicans are not significantly weaker than the same for non-Republicans consistent with H3b.
After completing the survey, respondents were informed that their statements would not be forwarded to the Senators in their state since this was an experiment.
The results in Online Appendix Table A7 come from linear probability models with no significant differences compared to either logit or probit models.
The F test for LowerPrices = CounterChina is 2.48 (p = 0.12).
Werner, Paletta, and Kim 2018, “Trump Weighs Rejoining Trans-Pacific Partnership amid Trade Dispute with China,” Washington Post, April 12, 2018, accessed May 20, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-weighs-rejoining-trans-pacific-partnership/2018/04/12/37d59500-3e71-11e8-8d53-eba0ed2371cc_story.html.
