Individuals, Disaggregation of the State, and Negotiation Tactics: Evidence from the European Union | Oxford Academic

Table 2.

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Results of the ordinal logistic regressions

	Veto	Rigidity	Issue-linkages	Side-payments	Common goals	Persuasion
Experience	−0.314	−0.541	−0.270	0.621	−0.249	−0.854*
	(0.323)	(0.446)	(0.288)	(0.353)	(0.317)	(0.386)
Style	−0.153	−0.613***	−0.057	−0.006	0.088	0.827***
	(0.187)	(0.178)	(0.176)	(0.195)	(0.199)	(0.185)
Identity	0.162	−0.050	−0.171	−0.341	−0.010	−0.272
	(0.189)	(0.209)	(0.191)	(0.197)	(0.183)	(0.214)
Power	− 16.605*	8.173	−7.198	15.054	4.997	−2.851
	(8.352)	(7.888)	(7.577)	(10.068)	(7.892)	(8.002)
Europeanism	0.008	0.032	−0.050*	0.014	−0.005	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Democracy	0.266	0.023	0.023	−0.071	0.132	−0.078
	(0.149)	(0.139)	(0.137)	(0.168)	(0.129)	(0.138)
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R	0.066	0.149	0.094	0.068	0.037	0.260
N	121	121	122	120	118	121

	Veto	Rigidity	Issue-linkages	Side-payments	Common goals	Persuasion
Experience	−0.314	−0.541	−0.270	0.621	−0.249	−0.854*
	(0.323)	(0.446)	(0.288)	(0.353)	(0.317)	(0.386)
Style	−0.153	−0.613***	−0.057	−0.006	0.088	0.827***
	(0.187)	(0.178)	(0.176)	(0.195)	(0.199)	(0.185)
Identity	0.162	−0.050	−0.171	−0.341	−0.010	−0.272
	(0.189)	(0.209)	(0.191)	(0.197)	(0.183)	(0.214)
Power	− 16.605*	8.173	−7.198	15.054	4.997	−2.851
	(8.352)	(7.888)	(7.577)	(10.068)	(7.892)	(8.002)
Europeanism	0.008	0.032	−0.050*	0.014	−0.005	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Democracy	0.266	0.023	0.023	−0.071	0.132	−0.078
	(0.149)	(0.139)	(0.137)	(0.168)	(0.129)	(0.138)
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R	0.066	0.149	0.094	0.068	0.037	0.260
N	121	121	122	120	118	121

Robust standard errors in parentheses; ^*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table 2.

Open in new tab

Results of the ordinal logistic regressions

	Veto	Rigidity	Issue-linkages	Side-payments	Common goals	Persuasion
Experience	−0.314	−0.541	−0.270	0.621	−0.249	−0.854*
	(0.323)	(0.446)	(0.288)	(0.353)	(0.317)	(0.386)
Style	−0.153	−0.613***	−0.057	−0.006	0.088	0.827***
	(0.187)	(0.178)	(0.176)	(0.195)	(0.199)	(0.185)
Identity	0.162	−0.050	−0.171	−0.341	−0.010	−0.272
	(0.189)	(0.209)	(0.191)	(0.197)	(0.183)	(0.214)
Power	− 16.605*	8.173	−7.198	15.054	4.997	−2.851
	(8.352)	(7.888)	(7.577)	(10.068)	(7.892)	(8.002)
Europeanism	0.008	0.032	−0.050*	0.014	−0.005	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Democracy	0.266	0.023	0.023	−0.071	0.132	−0.078
	(0.149)	(0.139)	(0.137)	(0.168)	(0.129)	(0.138)
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R	0.066	0.149	0.094	0.068	0.037	0.260
N	121	121	122	120	118	121

	Veto	Rigidity	Issue-linkages	Side-payments	Common goals	Persuasion
Experience	−0.314	−0.541	−0.270	0.621	−0.249	−0.854*
	(0.323)	(0.446)	(0.288)	(0.353)	(0.317)	(0.386)
Style	−0.153	−0.613***	−0.057	−0.006	0.088	0.827***
	(0.187)	(0.178)	(0.176)	(0.195)	(0.199)	(0.185)
Identity	0.162	−0.050	−0.171	−0.341	−0.010	−0.272
	(0.189)	(0.209)	(0.191)	(0.197)	(0.183)	(0.214)
Power	− 16.605*	8.173	−7.198	15.054	4.997	−2.851
	(8.352)	(7.888)	(7.577)	(10.068)	(7.892)	(8.002)
Europeanism	0.008	0.032	−0.050*	0.014	−0.005	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Democracy	0.266	0.023	0.023	−0.071	0.132	−0.078
	(0.149)	(0.139)	(0.137)	(0.168)	(0.129)	(0.138)
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R	0.066	0.149	0.094	0.068	0.037	0.260
N	121	121	122	120	118	121

Robust standard errors in parentheses; ^*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.